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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

Case No. 20030471-CA

RAYMOND MICHAEL QUINTANA,
Defendant/ Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals his convictions for one count each of burglary, a second degree
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (2003); and theft, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (2003). This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting fingerprint identification
evidence, when such evidence has been universally accepted by both the legal and
scientific communities for nearly one hundred years?
Standard of review. A "trial court's decision to admit expert scientific or technical
evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Schultz, 2002 UT
App 366, f 18, 58 P.3d 879 (citing Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001 UT
77,f 16, 31 P.3d 557.

2. Was evidence of defendant's fingerprint on a box that had been kept in the
victims' dresser for thirty years, and from which valuables had been taken, sufficient to
convict him of burglary and theft?
Standard of Review. Reversal is warranted only if the evidence, when viewed in
the light most favorable to the verdict, is "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he or she was convicted." State v. Hamilton,
2003 UT 22,1| 18, 70 P.3d 111 (citation omitted).
3. Was defendant entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense of
criminal trespass, when no evidence supported the intent element of that crime?
Standard of Review. "4The refusal to give a requested jury instruction on a
claimed lesser included offense is a legal determination, which [this court will] review for
correctness.'" State v. Knight, 2003 UT App 354, ^ 8, 485 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (quoting
State v. Simpson, 904 P.2d 709, 711 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following statutes and rule.
whose pertinent portions are reproduced below.
UTAH CODE

ANN. § 76-6-202 (2003). Burglary.

(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit:
(a) a felony;
(b)theft.
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UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-6-404 (2003). Theft.

A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-6-206(2) (2003). Criminal Trespass.

A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not amounting
to burglary:
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and:
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any
property;
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety of
another.
Utah R. Evid. 702. Testimony by Experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with one count each of burglary and theft. R. 3-4.
A jury convicted defendant as charged. R. 151-52. Defendant was sentenced to an
indeterminate term of one-to-fifteen years imprisonment. R. 162-63. This term was
ordered to run consecutively to other prison terms imposed based upon defendant's guilty
pleas to unrelated charges. R. 162-63. Defendant timely appealed. R. 164.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Virginia Cannon and her husband left their home "a little bit before 1:00" to attend
church services. R. 178: 78. When they left, their front door was locked and their house
was in order. R. 178: 78, 81. They returned ''about a quarter after 2:00" to find their
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front door knob crushed and their home in disarray. R. 178: 79-82. No one had
permission to be in their home while they were gone. R. 178: 81.
A black lacquer box that Mr. Cannon kept in his top dresser drawer had been
removed and emptied of approximately $30 in cash. R. 178: 86. The box had been in the
drawer for thirty years. R. 178: 96. Some of Mrs. Cannon's jewelry was also missing.
R. 178:82.
A crime lab technician from the Salt Lake City Police Department found several
latent prints throughout the Cannon's home, but most were smudged and therefore
unsuitable for identification purposes. R. 178: 125-26. The technician also found %'a
print with a lot of details" on the side of the black lacquer box. R. 178: 127. She "lifted"
this print and submitted it for identification. R. 178: 129, 133.
Karen Kido, another crime lab technician, analyzed the latent print taken from the
lacquer box. R. 178: 134, 156. She began by submitting the print into the Automated
Fingerprint Identification System ("AFIS"). R. 178: 134, 157. The AFIS search
indicated that the latent print matched defendant's right middle finger. R. 178: 158-59.
Ms. Kido pulled defendant's fingerprint card and examined all of the prints on that card.
R. 178: 59. Ms. Kido confirmed that the latent print matched the inked print of
defendant's right middle finger. Id.
Ms. Kido arrived at this conclusion by examining the details of the two prints. R.
178: 160-165. The Salt Lake Crime Lab requires that two fingerprints share at least ten
characteristics to support an identification. R. 178: 138. Ms. Kido identified over
fourteen matching characteristics between the two prints. R. 178: 163. The manager of
4

the crime lab, George Throckmorton, also compared the latent print with defendant's
inked print and confirmed Ms. Kido's conclusion. R. 178: 142-43, 165.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the reliability of fingerprint evidence in
State v. Hamilton. Therefore, Hamilton controls and defeats defendant's claim that
fingerprint evidence is unreliable.
Even if Hamilton does not control, defendant's claim that fingerprint evidence is
unreliable under State v. Rimmasch fails because Rimmasch only applies to expert
testimony based upon novel scientific principles. Fingerprint identification evidence is
not novel.
Even if Rimmasch applied, the State satisfied its burden because the trial court
could properly take judicial notice of the inherent reliability of fingerprint evidence.
Defendant offered no evidence demonstrating that fingerprint evidence was inherently
unreliable. Furthermore, every court that has considered a similar challenge has found
fingerprint evidence to be reliable and admissible.
Point II. Defendant's sufficiency claim fails because he neglects to view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Properly viewed, the most
reasonable inference from the evidence is that defendant's fingerprint was on the
Cannon's lacquer box because he burglarized their home.
Point III. The trial court correctly refused defendant's request for an instruction
on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass because no evidence suggested that he
entered the Cannon's home intending merely to trespass rather than to burglarize.
5

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
FINDING FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE TO
BE RELIABLE AND ADMISSIBLE
Defendant claims that fingerprint identification evidence is scientifically
unreliable and therefore inadmissible. Br. Aplt. at 12-40. Defendant attempts to
demonstrate that fingerprint evidence cannot satisfy the reliability standard announced by
the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993). Defendant then infers that fingerprint evidence would likewise fail to
satisfy Utah's reliability standard as set forth in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah
1989). Br. Aplt. at 16.
Defendant recognizes that Rimmasch only applies when a party seeks to introduce
evidence based upon novel scientific principles or techniques. Br. Aplt. at 15.
Nevertheless, he asserts that recent cases have created confusion regarding the scope of
the Rimmasch test by suggesting that it applies to both novel and well-established
scientific evidence. Br. Aplt. at 15-16. Therefore, he argues that this Court should apply
Rimmasch to fingerprint evidence, despite its long history of acceptance in Utah courts.
Br. Aplt. at 15-16.
This Court need not consider whether Rimmasch applies, because defendant's
claim fails for a more fundamental reason. The Utah Supreme Court has already upheld
the reliability of fingerprint evidence in State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 237-38 (Utah
1992), a holding that defendant ignores. This Court must follow Hamilton, Therefore,
defendant's challenge to the reliability of fingerprint evidence fails.
6

Even if Hamilton does not resolve this issue, it is clear that the Rimmasch test does
not apply to this well-established scientific evidence. But even assuming that fingerprint
evidence should be subject to Rimmasch, defendant's challenge would nevertheless fail.
Every court that has considered a similar challenge to fingerprint evidence has found it to
be reliable.
A. The Utah Supreme Court's holding in State v. Hamilton defeats
defendant's challenge to the reliability of fingerprint evidence.
The Utah Supreme Court has already considered the reliability of fingerprint
evidence in State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 237-38 (Utah 1992). Hamilton argued that
fingerprint evidence was unreliable because it suffered from "reliability problems similar
to those that affect eyewitness identification evidence." Id. at 237. He reasoned that the
unreliability of fingerprint evidence required that the trial court give a cautionary jury
instruction regarding the evidence. Id. at 237. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding
that "[fingerprint evidence . . . presents no analogous accuracy problems." Id. at 237.
The Court observed that "[qjuestions that go to the weight to be accorded fingerprint
evidence are fairly obvious and straightforward and are subject to complete illumination
through cross-examination and jury argument." Id. at 237-38.
While Hamilton may not have challenged fingerprint evidence on precisely the
same grounds that defendant raises, nevertheless, his challenge required the Utah
Supreme Court to evaluate claimed "reliability problems" of fingerprint identification
evidence. 827 P.2d at 237. While the Supreme Court acknowledged that "[sjcience has
shown eyewitness identification testimony to have inherent weaknesses," the Court was
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unconvinced that science, or any other field, had demonstrated "analogous accuracy
problems" with fingerprint evidence. Id. Therefore, Hamilton establishes that fingerprint
identification evidence is reliable and admissible. See id. at 237-38.
This Court is bound to follow Hamilton. See Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm 'n,
945 P.2d 125, 135 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("This court is bound by the doctrine of stare
decisis to follow supreme court decisions") (citing State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.
3 (Utah 1994) (additional citation omitted)). Consequently, defendant's claim that
fingerprint evidence is unreliable, fails under Hamilton.
B. Even if Hamilton does not control, defendant's claim fails
because Rimmasch applies only to novel scientific evidence.
Even if Hamilton does not resolve this issue, defendant's claim that fingerprint
evidence is unreliable under Rimmasch nevertheless fails. Defendant acknowledges that
the Rimmasch test applies only when a party presents novel scientific evidence. Br. Aplt.
at 15-16. Nevertheless, he argues that recent cases suggest that Rimmasch also applies to
well-established scientific evidence. Id. He also contends that Rimmasch should apply
because he attacks %ithe original premises underlying the foundation'' of fingerprint
evidence. Id. at 16. Case law from both the Utah Supreme Court and this Court clearly
establishes, however, that Rimmasch does not apply to well-established scientific
principles or techniques.
1. The Rimmasch test
In the pvQ-Rimmasch case of Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1234 (Utah
1980), the Utah Supreme Court "abandoned exclusive reliance on the 'general
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acceptance' test... and adopted an 'inherent reliability' standard" for admitting scientific
evidence. State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 639 (Utah 1996). In Rimmasch, the Court
considered whether the adoption of rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, altered the Phillips
"inherent reliability" standard. Id. The Court held that it did not, because unreliable
evidence "cannot, as a matter of law, 'assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue,'" the central requirement of Rule 702. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d
at 397-98 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 702).
Rimmasch dealt with novel scientific evidence, specifically, "scientific expert
testimony that purports to determine whether a witness is truthful on a particular
occasion." 775 P.2d at 403. In evaluating whether this evidence was admissible,
Rimmasch established a three-step test. See Crosby, 927 P.2d at 640-41. The test
requires a court to determine (1) "whether the scientific principles and techniques
underlying the expert's testimony are inherently reliable," (2) whether "the scientific
principles or techniques at issue have been properly applied to the facts of the particular
case by sufficiently qualified experts," and (3) "whether the proffered scientific evidence
will be more probative than prejudicial as required by rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence." Id. at 641 (citing Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398-400).
The first step of the Rimmasch analysis—a showing of inherent reliability—can be
demonstrated in one of two ways. First, a court may take judicial notice of the inherent
reliability of scientific principles or techniques that "have been generally recognized and
accepted by the legal and scientific communities." Id. (citing Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at
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400). If judicial notice is not appropriate, "an initial foundational showing" of inherent
reliability must be demonstrated. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398.
When an initial foundational showing is required, Rimmasch suggests three factors
for courts to consider: (1) "the correctness of the scientific principles underlying the
testimony"; (2) "the accuracy and reliability of the techniques utilized in applying the
principles to the subject matter before the court and in reaching the conclusion expressed
in the opinion"; and (3) "the qualifications of those actually gathering the data and
analyzing it." Rimmasch 775 P.2d at 403 (citing Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1235).
Rimmasch establishes the standard for admitting novel scientific evidence in Utah.
Crosby, 927 P.2d at 642. The United States Supreme Court announced a similar test for
scientific evidence in federal courts. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993). Although the standards are similar, Utah applies Rimmasch, not
Daubert. Crosby, 927 P.2d at 642.
2. The Rimmasch test does not apply to well-established
scientific evidence, such as fingerprint evidence.
Rimmasch does not apply to determine the admission of well-established scientific
evidence. ''Rimasch—and the 'inherent reliability' standard it established—dealt with
the admission of expert testimony 'based upon novel scientific principles or techniques/"
Patey v. LainharU 1999 UT 31, f 16, 977 P.2d 1193. When expert testimony is not based
upon novel scientific theories or techniques, the "testimony d[oes] not even implicate
Rimmasch, much less violate its requirements." Id.

10

The Utah Supreme Court has consistently maintained that Rimmasch applies only
to novel scientific evidence. For example, in State v, Kelley, 2000 UT 41,«[ 17, 1 P.3d
546, the defendant argued that the I.Q. test and mental age assessment that the expert
relied upon in forming his opinions did not meet the inherent reliability requirement of
Rimmasch. Utah case law, however, "recognizes a long history of using I.Q. tests . . . and
mental age assessments." Id. (citations omitted). Therefore, the Court concluded that
"reliance on Rimmasch is misplaced." Id.
Likewise, in State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42, If 16, 5 P.3d 642, the Utah Supreme
Court held that "the Rimmasch test was not intended to apply to all expert testimony.
Rather, Rimmasch is implicated only when the expert testimony is 'based on newly
discovered principles.'" (quoting Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396) (emphasis supplied by the
Adams Court). Because the tests that the expert used in Adams "have been administered
since the 1950's," the Court concluded that "the Rimmasch standard for admitting novel
scientific evidence does not apply to the present case." Id.
Defendant contends that there is some confusion regarding the scope of the
Rimmasch test. Br. Aplt. at 15-16. In support of his claim he cites a footnote from State
v. Schultz, 2002 UT App 366, % 22 n.7, stating ~[t]here seems to be some confusion as to
whether the Rimmasch test is limited in application to only scientific or technical
evidence that is based on novel principles or techniques." Defendant also claims that in
State v. Mead, the Utah Supreme Court "applied Rimmasch to apparently established
scientific principles concerning the cause of a person's death." Br. Aplt. at 16 (citing
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State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58,1} 41, 27 P.3d 1115). Mead, however, did not apply
Rimmasch.
Mead did not apply Rimmasch to established scientific evidence because Mead did
not involve the application of scientific evidence. 2001 UT 58, f 41. The defendant in
Mead was charged with murdering his wife. Id. at f 1. The medical examiner originally
certified the wife's death as an "accident." Id. at f 35. The medical examiner then
received additional witness statements revealing that the defendant had told one witness
that his wife was going to have an "accident," and that when she did, he would have an
alibi. Id. at % 10. Another witness statement revealed that Mead had offered to pay the
witness to kill Mead's wife. Id. at f 12. After receiving this additional evidence, the
medical examiner changed the certification of death to "homicide." Id. at ^ 35. Mead
claimed that the medical examiner's explanation for changing the certification of death
was inadmissible under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence. Id. at % 39.
The Supreme Court recognized that Mead's reliance on Rule 702 was misplaced
because the medical examiner's testimony did not involve scientific evidence. Id.
Rather, the testimony involved "the application of the physical evidence to two different
proposed sets of facts." Id. (second emphasis added). Rimmasch only applies when
"scientific principles or techniques" are applied "to the facts." Id. at f 40. Therefore,
Mead does not disturb the Utah Supreme Court's prior holdings that Rimmasch only
applies to novel scientific evidence.
In Schultz, this Court addressed and resolved any confusion regarding the scope of
Rimmasch. This Court noted the apparent confusion Mead had created regarding the
12

scope of Rimmasch. Schultz, 2002 UT App, f 22 n.7. Nevertheless, this Court held that
"[i]f scientific testimony is not based on novel scientific principles or techniques, the
Rimmasch test is not implicated. Id. f 22 (citing Patey, 1999 UT 31, f 16, and Adams,
2000 UT 42,1f 16). This Court did not apply Rimmasch to expert testimony concerning
"the use of canines to help detect the presence of accelerants" during arson investigations
because it recognized that this evidence "is generally accepted within the fire
investigation community." Id. at ^ 24. Therefore, Schultz reaffirms that Rimmasch does
not apply to long-established scientific evidence. See id.
Following Mead and Schultz, the Utah Supreme Court resolved any lingering
doubt about the scope of Rimmasch in Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115, «J1[ 58-59, 61
P.3d 1068. The Court noted that "Rimmasch . . . set the limits of its own application."
Id. at % 58. It then recited a long line of cases, including Adams, Kelley, and Patey, in
which the Court consistently held that "'the Rimmasch test was not intended to apply to
all expert testimony. Rather Rimmasch is implicated only when the expert testimony is
based on newly discovered principles." Id. at \ 59 (quoting Adams, 2000 UT 42, ^ 16)
(internal quotations omitted).
"Fingerprint identification has been admissible as reliable evidence in criminal
trials in this country since at least 1911." United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 269-70
(4th Cir.), cert denied, 124 S.Ct. 220 (2003); see also, State v. Hymas, 131 P.2d 791, 792
(Utah 1942) (the first reported case in Utah mentioning the admission of fingerprint
evidence). Fingerprint identification evidence is not novel; therefore, Rimmasch does not
apply to the expert testimony in this case. See Alder, 2002 UT 115, ^[59.
13

C. Even if the Rimmasch test applies, it was satisfied in this case.
Even assuming—in spite of the holdings in Patey, Kelley, Adams, Schultz, and
Alder—that the Rimmasch test applies in this case, the State satisfied the test.
Defendant's claim that fingerprint identification evidence is not inherently reliable only
implicates Rimmasch's first prong. See Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641. Defendant does not
claim that the fingerprint evidence was inadmissible under Rimmasch's second and third
prongs. Br. Aplt. at 12-40. In fact, defendant chooses to analyze the reliability of
fingerprint evidence under Daubert, rather than Rimmasch. Id. at 16. Accordingly,
assuming that Rimmasch applies, the only issue is whether the State demonstrated that
fingerprint evidence was inherently reliable under the first prong of the test.
1. The trial court properly took judicial notice of the inherent
reliability of fingerprint evidence.
The State satisfied Rimmasch's first prong because the trial court could properly
take judicial notice of the inherent reliability of fingerprint identification evidence.
Rimmasch's first prong may be satisfied either by judicial notice, or by the establishment
of sufficient foundation to demonstrate the inherent reliability of the evidence. See
Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641 (citing Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 400). Judicial notice of inherent
reliability is appropriate when the proffered evidence has "been generally recognized and
accepted by the legal and scientific communities." Id. The inherent reliability of
fingerprint evidence qualifies for judicial notice.
Judicial notice was appropriate because fingerprint evidence has been "generally
recognized and accepted" by the legal community. The State is not aware of any court,
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state or federal, that has foundfingerprintevidence to be unreliable.1 As noted above, the
Utah Supreme Court upheld the reliability of fingerprint evidence in State v. Hamilton,
827 P.2d 232, 237-38 (Utah 1992). Moreover, every federal circuit court to consider the
reliability of fingerprint evidence, even after Daubert, has found the evidence to be
reliable and admissible. See United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 682-83 (8th Cir.
2003); United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 269-70 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 124 S.Ct. 220
(2003); United States v. Hernandez, 299 F.3d 984, 991 (8th Cir. 2002), cert, denied, 537
U.S. 1134 (2003); United States v. Rogers, 26 Fed. Appx. 171, 173 (4th Cir. 2001), cert,
denied, 535 U.S. 1041 (2003); United States v. Howard, 260 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir.
2001); United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir. 1996).
Fingerprint evidence has also been "generally recognized and accepted" by the
scientific community. The "ACE-V" method of fingerprint analysis employed by the
expert in this case, R. 178: 160-66, is accepted and used by crime lab technicians across
this country, as well as their counterparts in England, Canada, and other countries. See
Ller Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 560.
Because fingerprint identification evidence has "'been generally recognized and
accepted by the legal and scientific communities," see Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641, the trial
court properly took judicial notice of its inherent reliability. R. 178: 152. This was
sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the Rimmasch test. See id.
1

One federal district court did grant a defense motion to exclude fingerprint
evidence as unreliable. See United States v. Ller Plaza, No. CR. 98-362-10, 2002 WL
27305 at * 20 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002). After holding an evidentiary hearing, however, the
court promptly reversed itself and withdrew its prior opinion. See United States v. Ller
Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 575-76, (E.D. Pa. 2002).
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2. Defendant produced no evidence suggesting that the inherent
reliability of fingerprint evidence has been mistakenly
accepted.
Defendant failed to demonstrate that judicial notice of the reliability of fingerprint
evidence was improper. Defendant correctly observes that the proponent of the scientific
or technical evidence bears the burden of demonstrating inherent reliability. Br. Aplt. at
38. Given the long acceptance of fingerprint evidence, however, the State was entitled to
rely on judicial notice to satisfy its burden. See Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641 (citing
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 400). Consequently, when judicial notice of inherent reliability is
appropriate, defendant bears the burden of at least producing some evidence that would
cast substantial doubt on the general acceptance of the evidence at issue.
In this case, defendant did not present any evidence to suggest that fingerprint
evidence was unreliable. The entire extent of defendant's attack on the reliability of the
fingerprint evidence at trial consists of three and one-quarter pages of trial transcript in
which defense counsel posed various voir dire questions to the State's fingerprint expert.
R. 178: 140-43. Defense counsel questioned the witness regarding (1) whether there is a
uniform standard for determining when a fingerprint match can be made, (2) whether any
study has ever conclusively proven that fingerprints are unique and unchanging, and (3)
whether fingerprint analysis has a known error rate. Id. The trial court was satisfied with
the expert's answers to these questions and denied defense counsel's objection to the
expert's testimony. R. 178: 152. That ruling was correct.
Federal courts have universally rejected similar challenges to the reliability of
fingerprint evidence. For example, in Crisp, the defendant argued that "the premises
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underlying fingerprinting evidence [that fingerprints are unique and permanent] have not
been adequately tested." 324 F.3d at 266. He also argued "that there is no known rate of
error for latent fingerprint identifications, that fingerprint examiners operate without a
uniform threshold of certainty required for a positive identification, and that fingerprint
evidence has not achieved general acceptance in the relevant scientific community." Id.
The Fourth Circuit carefully reviewed the defendant's challenges in light ofDaubert's
requirements. Id. at 266-69. The court then concluded that while more scholarly review
and the development of more consistent standards would be desirable, the defendant "has
offered us no reason to reject outright a form of evidence that has so ably withstood the
test of time." Id. at 269.
Federal district court judges in Ller Plaza and Howard have also rejected
challenges identical to those that defendant raised. After holding an evidentiary hearing
and carefully examining Daubert's requirements, the federal district court in Haward
rejected the defendant's claims that fingerprint evidence was unreliable given a lack of
(1) uniform standards governing when a match may be declared, (2) a known error rate,
and (3) statistical evidence establishing that fingerprints are indeed unique. See 117 F.
Supp. 2d at 850-51, 855. Likewise, the court in Ller Plaza held that fingerprint evidence
satisfied the Daubert factors. 188 F. Supp. 2d at 575.
Defendant produced no evidence at trial demonstrating that fingerprint evidence
was unreliable.2 On appeal, defendant relies entirely on law review articles to support his

2

On cross-examination the State's fingerprint expert admitted that she was aware
that West Valley Crime Lab Technician Scott Spjut had testified that a latent fingerprint
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claim that fingerprint evidence is unreliable. Br. Aplt. at 12-40. Some legal
commentators have criticized the reliability of fingerprint evidence. See, e.g., Robert
Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint Science is Revealed, 75 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 605 (2002). Courts, however, have unanimously rejected these criticisms.
See, e.g., Crisp, 324 F.3d at 269. Defendant concedes that every court that has
considered this issue has held that fingerprint evidence satisfies the Daubert factors and
is therefore reliable. Br. Aplt. at 32. Consequently, defendant has failed to show that the
trial court abused its discretion when it took judicial notice of the inherent reliability of
fingerprint evidence.
II. WHEN PROPERLY VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO THE JURY'S VERDICT, THE EVIDENCE
AMPLY SUPPORTS DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS
Defendant claims that the only evidence tying him to the burglary was his
fingerprint on the lacquer box. Br. Aplt. at 42. He argues that this evidence was
insufficient because uthe State could not show when the fingerprint was placed on the
box or that [he] took any of the stolen property." Id. Given the lack of direct evidence
on these points, defendant reasons that the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are
too speculative to prove his guilt. Br. Aplt. at 44. When viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict, however, the evidence amply establishes defendant's guilt.

matched a defendant, when in fact, the latent print came from the crime victim. R. 178:
167. The State's expert explained, however, that the misidentification arose from a
clerical error. R. 178: 168. Moreover, the State's expert conceded that errors can be
made any time human beings are involved in a project. R. 178: 167.
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"In reviewing a jury verdict, [this Court will] view ;the evidence and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict.'" State v.
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 18, 70 P.3d 111 (quoting State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, f 2, 6
P.3d 1116. This Court "will not overturn a jury verdict unless the evidence presented at
trial is 4so insufficient that reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict.'" State
v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, f 22, 69 P.3d 1278 (quoting State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, f 42,
994P.2d 177).
Defendant claims that this Court must conduct an additional level of analysis
because the State's case was based entirely on circumstantial evidence. Br. Aplt. at 4142. He relies on State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), to support this
claim. Lyman states that when a conviction is based solely on circumstantial evidence, a
court must review the evidence to determine "'(1) whether there is any evidence that
supports each and every element of the crime charged, and (2) whether the inferences that
can be drawn from that evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience
sufficient to prove each legal element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id.
(quoting State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997) (additional citation omitted)).
Defendant argues that the evidence failed to satisfy Lyman's second requirement. Br.
Aplt. at 44.
Defendant's claim fails because he neglects to view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict. Even under Lyman, "'the evidence and all inferences
which may reasonably be drawn from it'" must be viewed "'in the light must favorable to
the verdict of the jury.'" 966 P.2d at 281 (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 236
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(Utah 1992)). When properly viewed, the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom
amply supports defendant's guilt.
The Cannons were gone for less than ninety minutes. R. 178: 78-79. While they
were out, someone entered their home without their permission, removed a black lacquer
box from a dresser drawer, and stole the money it contained. R. 178: 81, 86, 88. The
intruder also stole some jewelry. R. 178: 82. The lacquer box had remained in the
dresser drawer for approximately thirty years. R. 178:96. Defendant's fingerprint was
found on the box. R. 178: 165, 181-82. No evidence suggested that defendant had access
to the Cannon's home at any time other than when the burglary occurred.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, a reasonable juror could
easily find defendant guilty. In fact, the inference from this evidence that is most si lidly
grounded in "logic and reasonable human experience," see Lyman, 966 P.2d at 281, is
that defendant committed the burglary and theft.
Furthermore, Lyman recognizes that "where the trial court has considered a
defendant's insufficient evidence claim, as is the case here, such action iends further
weight to the jury's verdict.'" Id. (quoting Brown, 948 P.2d at 344). The trial court
considered and rejected defendant's sufficiency claim. R. 178: 171-75. Consequently,
even under Lyman, the evidence amply supports defendant's convictions.
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III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED DEFENDANT'S
REQUEST FOR AN INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS BECAUSE
NO EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE INTENT ELEMENT OF
THAT CRIME
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the
lesser included offense of criminal trespass. Br. Aplt. at 45. Because there was no direct
evidence establishing when his fingerprint was placed on the lacquer box, defendant
reasons that the evidence supported a theory that he entered the victims' home at some
time other than when the burglary occurred, and that he did so without the intent to
commit theft or a felony. Id. at 46-47. Defendant also contends that the trial court was
obligated to give his requested instruction because the court acknowledged that "it's
remotely possible" that the jury could believe this alternate theory. Id. at 47.
Defendant's claim fails, however, because there was no rational basis in the evidence
from which a jury could conclude that defendant entered the Cannon's home at some
other time, intending only to trespass rather than burglarize.
When a defendant requests an instruction on a lesser included offense, a trial court
must apply the two-part test detailed in State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983).
See State v. Knight, 2003 UT App 354, f 9, 485 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (relying on the Baker
test). Under Baker, a defendant is entitled to a requested lesser offense instruction only if
(1) the statutory elements of the greater and lesser crimes overlap and the evidence of the
greater offense includes proof of some or all of the overlapping elements, and (2) the
evidence at trial provides a "rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the
offense charged and convicting him of the included offense." 671 P.2d at 159.
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"In determining whether there is a 'rational basis' in the evidence to support both
acquittal of the greater and conviction of the lesser offense, a trial judge, though he or she
cannot weigh the credibility of the evidence, must nevertheless decide whether there is 'a
sufficient quantum of evidence' to send the issue to the jury." State v. Kruger, 2000 UT
60, f 12, 6 P.3d 1116 (quoting Baker, 671 P.2d at 159). Consequently, the trial court
must '"view the evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the defense.'" Id. (quoting State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 529 (Utah 1983)). A
defendant's right to a lesser offense instruction is not absolute and is necessarily "limited
by the evidence presented at trial." Baker, 671 P.2d at 157.
Assuming arguendo that the first Baker prong is satisfied because criminal
trespass is a lesser included offense of burglary, defendant's claim nevertheless fails to
satisfy the second prong. There was no "rational basis" in the evidence for acquitting
defendant of burglary and convicting him of criminal trespass.
A person commits burglary if he "enters of remains unlawfully in a building" with
the intent to commit a felony or a theft. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (2003). A person
commits criminal trespass if he "enters of remains unlawfully on property" and intends
"to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any property" or "intends to
commit any crime, other than theft or a felony." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-206(2) (2003).
There was no rational basis in the evidence to support defendant's theory that he
entered the Cannon's home intending only to trespass, rather than burglarize. His
fingerprint was found on a box that the Cannons had kept in a dresser drawer for thirty
years. R. 178: 96. No evidence supported the theory that defendant entered the Cannon's
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home and touched the lacquer box at some time other than when the burglary occurred.
Furthermore, money was missing from the box with defendant's fingerprint on it. R.
178: 86, 88, 165, 181-82. Defendant did not testify or offer any other evidence
supporting his alternative explanation of how his fingerprint ended up on the box. R.
178: 170. Therefore, all the evidence presented at trial supported the State's theory that
defendant burglarized the home.
Utah appellate courts have consistently refused to require an instruction on
criminal trespass when, as in this case, there was no evidence to suggest that the
defendant entered a property intending to do anything other than commit a theft. See
State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 662-63 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("No evidence was presented
suggesting that defendant entered the property with intent to commit a crime other than
theft"); State v. Bales, 61S P.2d 573, 576 (Utah 1983) ("There was no evidence that
defendants' entry was with any intent other than to commit theft"); State v. Johnson, 671
P.2d 215, 217 (Utah 1983) ("Since all the evidence in this case is consistent only with the
burglary charge and there is no evidence consistent with criminal trespass, we affirm on
the basis of State v. Baker"); Baker, 671 P.2d at 160 (defendant "does not point to any
evidence in the record which goes to the specific intent elements of the crime of criminal
trespass"). Consequently, the trial court correctly declined to give a criminal trespass
instruction.
Defendant claims that in rejecting his requested instruction, the trial court
erroneously viewed the evidence in a light most favorable to the State. Br. Aplt. at 47. In
support of his claim, he cites the trial court's comment explaining that defense counsel
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was asking the court to "look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the State
Id. While the trial court did misspeak, it did not erroneously evaluate the evidence.
The trial court made its comment while attempting to correct the prosecutor's
misunderstanding of defense counsel's argument in favor of the criminal trespass
instruction. Addressing the prosecutor, the trial court stated, "Well, that's not what Mr.
Biggs is saying, as I understand it." R. 178: 177-78. The court continued, "He's saying
that if you look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, all that you really
know is that at some point, Mr. Quintana touched that box, which was in the house, that's
all that you know." R. 178: 178.
Defense counsel's response to the trial court's comment demonstrates that the
comment was merely a misstatement, rather than a misunderstanding of the law. In direct
response to the trial court's comment, defense counsel agreed that the trial court had
correctly summarized his argument. Id. Certainly defense counsel was not urging the
trial court to erroneously interpret the evidence. Rather, defense counsel's response
indicates that he understood the trial court to have simply misspoke.
In any event, the trial court did not erroneously evaluate the evidence. Here, there
was no conflicting evidence regarding defendant's intent. Therefore, the trial court
correctly found that even when viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, there was
no rational basis in the evidence upon which the jury could have convicted defendant of
criminal trespass.
This case is distinguishable from State v. Knight. In Knight, there was conflicting
evidence regarding the defendant's intent. 2003 UT App 354, ^ 15. Knight was on trial
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for sexual abuse of a child. Id. at f 7. The victim, Knight's step-daughter, testified that
while asleep in Knight's bed, Knight slowly slid his hand into her underwear, fondled her
genitalia, and penetrated her vagina with his fingertip. Id. at 13. The State argued that
Knight's actions demonstrated his intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desire. See id. at «|
16. In contrast, Knight testified that he was sleeping and dreaming of his wife when he
touched his step-daughter. Id. at f 6. Given the conflicting evidence of intent, this Court
held that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense
of sexual battery. Id. at ^f 18.
Unlike Knight, there was no conflicting evidence regarding defendant's intent in
entering the Cannons' home. Therefore, like Baker, and unlike Knight, there was no
reasonable basis in the evidence to justify giving a lesser included offense instruction in
this case.
Defendant argues that he was entitled to an instruction on criminal trespass
because his theory is a reasonable hypothesis supported by the State's undisputed
evidence. Br. Aplt. at 46-47. As Baker recognized, however, the existence of alternative
theories "goes only to the sufficiency of the evidence, to convict [defendant] of burglary;
it does not address the separate and distinct intent elements necessary for criminal
trespass." 671 P.2d at 160. Thus, defendant's claim fails because it simply restates his
sufficiency claim in a different guise.
Finally, defendant argues that he was entitled to a criminal trespass instruction
because the trial court commented that it was "remotely possible" that a jury could
believe his theory of the case. Br. Aplt. at 47. The trial court did acknowledge that
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defendant's theory was ^remotely possible." R. 178: 179. There is a significant
difference, however, between a theory that is %4remotely possible" and one that has a
"rational basis" in the evidence. See Baker, 671 P.2d at 159.
As explained above, there was no "rational basis" in the evidence to support
defendant's theory. "[Defendant's right to a lesser included offense instruction is
limited by the evidence presented at trial." Id. at 157. No evidence supported
defendant's theory that his intent was to trespass rather than burglarize. Therefore,
although the evidence did not completely exclude defendant's alternative hypothesis, it
had no "rational basis" in the evidence and the trial court correctly refused to give
defendant's requested instruction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's convictions should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this [r ^day of February 2004.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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